Documents show military was reluctant participant at Mount Carmel

Images of the military's involvement at Mount Carmel still wind through our collective memory six years later.

Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Abrams tanks roamed the landscape outside Waco in 1993 from one edge of the TV screen to the other. Behind the scenes, there were caches of generators, gas masks and night vision equipment.

But documents released to Cox Newspapers under the Freedom of Information Act show the military was for the most part a reluctant participant. After a bitter internal struggle, it scaled back its assistance to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as the agency prepared to raid the Branch Davidian compound and during the siege refused to sign off on the FBI's tear gas assault.

The military's involvement at Mount Carmel began in December 1992 when the ATF first contacted Operation Alliance, an agency that coordinates and prioritizes requests from law enforcement for the military's help in fighting drugs. ATF officials asked the military to help serve a search warrant to "a dangerous extremist organization believed to be producing methamphetamine."

Congressional critics would later charge that the ATF cooked up the drug allegation simply to get the military's help.

By law, specifically the Posse Comitatus Act, the military is barred from intervening in police actions except under certain circumstances. Helping in the war against drugs, however, is one of the exceptions.

ATF officials, however, wanted to arrest Koresh for stockpiling illegal weapons.

In a Jan. 22, 1993, letter to Operation Alliance, ATF officials requested a training site in Central Texas, training by special forces troops, instruction in driving Bradley Fighting Vehicles and the loan of seven Bradleys for two weeks in February.

Operation Alliance forwarded ATF's request on Feb. 2, 1993 -- less than a month before the Feb. 28, 1993, raid on Mount Carmel -- to El Paso's Fort Bliss and the military's headquarters for domestic anti-drug efforts, known as Joint Task Force-6. Officials there were told that assistance was "in direct support of interdiction activities along the Southwest border."

ATF's request hit a snag the next day when the commander of the Army's special forces questioned its legality.

The concerns of Rapid Support Unit Commander Maj. Mark Petree at Fort Bragg, N.C., eventually reached the legal adviser for the Special Operations Command, Maj. Phillip Lindley, Office of Staff Judge Advocate.

Petree is now deputy director of Special Operations Command in Panama. An Army spokeswoman said comments regarding Mount Carmel can only come from the Department of Defense. Lindley is retired, but declined to comment citing a subpoena he received in connection with the upcoming civil lawsuit against the federal government by surviving Branch Davidians.

In a Feb. 3, 1993, memo, however, Lindley stated that he believed the ATF's request would make the military an active partner in a domestic police action, a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.

"Since this was not an emergency situation, in full control of the civilian authorities on civilian lands with expert civilian (drug) laboratory 'takedown' teams available and civilian medical facilities (available) ... this appeared to go beyond the DOD guidance for these missions," Lindley wrote.

Lindley recommended the military scale back its offer of support to the ATF. That recommendation led to a blistering call from the legal adviser to Joint Task Force-6, who accused Lindley of being out to "undermine" and "undercut" the success of the mission, according to the memo by Lindley.

Later that same day, Lindley called his superior, Lt. Col. Douglas Andrews, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate.

Andrews disagreed only slightly with Lindley's viewpoint, according to Andrews' declassified report on his participation in the matter. He told Lindley that the military could probably evaluate the ATF's plan of action, but not "scrub" it, or rewrite it for the agency.

"... everything else was a legal no-go," Andrews wrote. "I felt that this was the true outer edge of the envelope and did not feel all that comfortable with it."

After being told that Joint Task Force-6 was asking the Department of Defense to approve the ATF's request for help, Lindley got a phone call at about 7 p.m. from the judge advocate's office. The proposed medical mission was off and the military's only involvement with ATF would be to coordinate the agency's use of an Army range and to comment on its plan to raid Mount Carmel, Lindley was told, according to his Feb. 3 memo.

Joint Task Force-6 acknowledged the restraints on the military's involvement.

"RSU assets will not become directly involved in BATF operational planning, nor assume responsibility for the BATF plan," a task force memo read. "Observing and critiquing the rehearsal of the operational plan is authorized, particularly in the area of safety. Rehearsal critique comments will be provided as the opinion of trained military observers, not an official DOD endorsement of the soundness of the plan."

At Fort Hood, on Feb. 24, 1993, ATF leaders met with the special forces troops assigned to train them.

The military advisers helped construct a mock-up of Mount Carmel and opened the rifle range for ATF's sharpshooters, who practiced shooting from a range of 260 meters. The Special Forces troops even impersonated Davidians to help in the ATF's training. According to written statements taken from the troops, however, they kept within the guidelines given them.

"In my eyes, command made it very clear that in no way are we to get involved with the planning of the MSN (mission), make suggestions about the MSN, or teach tactics in any form or have anything to do with the MSN," wrote Staff Sergeant (SSG) Cordell Ackley.

The strictures wore on the Special Forces troops, according to their statements.

SSG. Jay Burkhardt reported that several ATF agents asked if he could accompany them on the raid as medical support.

"My response each time was no, due to restrictions placed upon us by federal law," Burkhardt wrote, adding, "I felt as if my hands were tied."

Maj. Petree took steps to ensure the Special Forces troops were limited in what help they could provide to the ATF -- no matter how sympathetic they were.

"Based on the mission constraints, I picked the team which would support BATF based upon the fact that none had attended Special Operations Training in Close Quarter Battle," Petree wrote in a memo. "When we got to Fort Hood, this fact was told to the BATF so that they would not think of the Special Forces element as experts in SOT/CQB."

On Feb. 28, 1993, the day of the ATF's raid on Mount Carmel, the military ordered its training force to be on the road headed for home.

"If anything, we may be criticized for being too conservative and not providing enough support," wrote Col. Donald DeCort, Staff Judge Advocate, in a May 18, 1993, memo. "We can live with that!"

The death of four ATF agents -- five Branch Davidians died as well during the raid -- at Mount Carmel led to the FBI getting the Bradleys and other machinery and equipment denied to the ATF. There have been accusations that the military's more active role went as far as members of the Army's Delta Force squad engaging in a shoot-out with the Branch Davidians on the day of the fire that killed Koresh and 75 followers.

Military officials, however, insist only three Delta Force members were at Mount Carmel on April 19, 1993, as observers.

The documents released to Cox Newspapers show a continuing reluctance by the military to fully involve itself with the government's actions.

Although Delta Force officers met with Attorney General Janet Reno, an unnamed Delta Force officer reported in a document that Reno was only offered limited advice -- including the military's belief that inserting CS gas into the residence might cause mothers to panic and "run off and leave infants." A disclaimer was added, however, that the military's rules of engagement were so different from the FBI's that it made it difficult to offer advice.

As an example, Delta Force officers told Reno that if Mount Carmel were a military operation, the goal of ending the siege would be done by capturing or killing Koresh, according to the FOI document.

Ultimately, though, the military refused to "grade the FBI paper," its plan to flush the Branch Davidians out of Mount Carmel, "as this was not a military mission," according to a military synopsis of the Reno meeting. A May 15, 1993, memo from the Army's special forces command stated that the Delta Force officers "responded only to specific questions and did not approve, critique or attempt to influence (the) 'tear gas' plan."

The Delta Force member's report makes it clear how out of place he felt at the Reno meeting.

"Their approach was substantially different than anything that I have encountered," he wrote. "They were not assaulting the compound and they were not there to rescue anyone. This was surprising to me, but certainly not something of which I am critical. It is simply a different way of looking at the situation."

Mark England can be reached at mengland@wacotrib.com or 757-5744.